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The End of the Cold War and
the Construedvist Ascendance*
by Kimikazu SHIGEMASA**
Abstract
This paper traces the theoretical challenge against the mainstream international relations
theories by way of analysing the factors conducive to the demise of the Cold War. Against the
backdrop of realist/neorealist accounts of the Cold War's ending, constructivists try to high-
light the ideational factors which they considered had caused the cataclysmic transformation
of the Cold War international system. Four issues are raised in this paper to demonstrate this
"constructivist turn": changes in domestic politics in the Soviet Union; the role of nuclear
weapons; the solid Western alliance system; and internal flaws in Soviet ideology.
Ke ywo rds : realist, liberals, constructivist, political ideas, discursive factors
*　The author expresses his gratitude to Mr. Virgil Hawkins for enhancing language clarity.
* * Ph. D. Candidate, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
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"Not ideas, but material and ideal interest, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very fre-
quently the `world images'that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen [at railway
junctions], determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of
interests."-Max Weberl'
Emergence of Constructivist Approaches to World Politics: the End二
雌he Cold War^as a Catalyst for Theoretical Appraisal
The end of the Cold War has not merely generated a reassessment of foreign and se-
cunty policies rooted in Cold War thinking for practitioners, but it has also posed theo-
retical challenges for international relations scholars and historians alike, in understand-
ing the nature of the rapidly changing world. Regarding the task of international rela-
tions scholars, the problem is, according to Fred Halliday, not whether or not the coレ
lapse of Soviet bloc in 1989 posed theoretical questions for international relations, but,
rather, what the issues of substance posed by the past really are, and which processes
cu汀ently under way in the world outside merit our prospective analytic and theoretical
attention2'. Neorealism and neoliberalism, which have been deemed the conventional
and mainstream language of international relations theory, henceforth, have been under
critical scrutiny. There have been numerous writings in defence and attempting to mod-
lfy these mainstream international relations theories since the end of the Cold War3).
1) Max Weber, "Social Pyschology of the World Religion," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) From Max
Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 280
2) Fred Halliday, "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Con-
elusions," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1995),p.40.
3) Mary Kaldor, Tlie lm塔inary War: Understanding the血'-West Conflict (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990),
Michael J. Hogan (ed.) The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1992), John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,"
and John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," Christopher Layne,
"The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller
(eds.) The Cold Waγ and A妙.蝣Pro.申ecかfor Peace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), William
C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," and Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of In-
ternational Politics," in Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.) The Perils of Anar-
chy: ContempomりRealism and International Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts‥ The MIT Press, 1995), Rich-
ard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Introduction: International Relations Theory and End of the
Cold War," Michael Doyle, HLiberalism and the End of the Cold War," in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas
Risse-Kappen (eds.) International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1995) and John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking ColdウVaγ History (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997), John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of
Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Position," Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," and Stephen
Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," in American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, 1997, pp.
912, 913-917, 931-935, respectively. These are just examples. Kaldor, in particular, argued that the Cold War
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From the viewpoint of也e study of diplomatic history, John Lewis Gaddis, a noted
Cold War historian, has claimed that no approach to the study of international relations
claiming bo仇 foresight and competence should have failed to predict也e Cold War's
demise4'. Yet the problem is not that none of也e approaches to the study of internation-
al relations have demonstrated predictive ability, but that certain brands of international
relations theories-classical realism and neorealism in particular-may incur the criticism
that was levelled by Gaddis. Having that said, it seems that Gaddis cannot vindicate his
own criticism because his earlier work can encapsulate some tenets of neorealism
against which his own critique can be applied. His thought-provoking "long peace"也e-
sis reveals some Waltzian neorealist themes. Writes Gaddis:
'the passage of time and the accumulation of experience has made clear certain structural
elements of stability in the bipolar system of international relations仏at were not present in
仇e multipolar systems that preceded it…"5)
According to him, the post-Second World War world has been characterised by the
military power differentiation between victors at the end of that war; a simple bipolar
structure in post-1945 world in which sophisticated leadership was not required to main-
tarn international order, but in which structural constraint discourages irresponsibility;
and alliance systems are stable in a bipolar structure6'. The presence of nuclear weap-
ons is considered to have contributed to this peace by adding behavioural restraint, pre-
venting the occurrence of irrational acts on the part of the nuclear powers, particularly
both也e United States and Soviet Union, which were the poles in the bipolar system7'.
These assertions are clearly consistent with the logic of Waltzian neorealism, of which
the central themes are the stability of a bipolar international system and the state's pri-
was an imaginary war instigated by the two different systems, which reinforced each other through their
shared need for it, and thus that it served to consolidate and reproduce the two social systems, pp. 5-6. This
statement sounds akin to the constructivist's account of social construct in that both systems are reflective of
each other. Her prediction, however, of the events culminated in the dismantling of the Cold War was rather
modest.
4) John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," Lynn-Jones and Miller
(eds.) The Cold War andA勧p. 324.
5) John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into ¥　助tory of the Cold lWar(Oxford: Oxford University Pre-
ss, 1987), p. 221.
6) Ibid., pp. 22ト222.
7) While there is contention among scholars of international relations regarding the extent to which the pres-
ence of nuclear forces has "contributed" to the absence of wars between nuclear powers. Even so it is argua-
ble that Gaddis may agree with Waltz's argument that "more" nuclear weapon states might be "better" than
less, in terms of the stability of the international system. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread o/Nu-
clear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).
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mary interest in physical survival in an anarchic world.
However, contrary to the lacuna of international relations theories claimed by Gaddis,
some realists now emphasise that it was not realism per se that was put to test by the
transformation of the Cold War system, but the rigid structural realism of Kenneth
Waltz, which dominated at the time8'. Waltz has postulated his oft-cited three charac-
tenstic systemic principles-the ordering principle of the system (namely, anarchic na-
ture); the differentiation of units in the system (no differentiation among the units lead-
ing states to strive for survival in the system); and the distribution of capabilities of the
units in the system. A major problem with Waltz's unit-structure relationship is that it
prevents us from examining the systemic change induced by the units themselves9'.
Hence his inadequate attention to the unit-level analysis has exposed conceptual prob-
lems. Mainstream international relations theories including Waltz's draw on various
levels of analysis, ranging from human nature, the state, the unmeasurable structural ef-
feet of international system and the omnipresent anarchy inherent in the international
system, and the role of international institutions in mitigating this anarchy. Despite
these insightful analytical frameworks, they have proved insufficient to provide a predi-
cative capacity to explain change and transformation. Analytical reliance solely on sys-
temic factors makes it difficult to look at the changes at the domestic level, hence
blackboxing the interactions of domestic politics level. Naturally, one might ask: Hif the
structure which determines the relations between states is objectively and inescapably
anarchic, then insecurity is an environmental constant and the condition of peace must
be the eternal vigilance of military autarky. But then how did the Cold War end?"1
Taking into consideration the indeterminacy of purely systemic factors, Gaddis recently
wrote:
"It [old Cold War history] emphasized interest, which it mostly defined in material terms-
what people possessed or wanted to possess. It tended to overlook ideas-what people believed,
or wanted to believe-. The `new'Cold War history will take ideas seriously: here the way that
conflict ended is bound to reshape our view of how it began and evolved. For the events of
1989-91 make sense only in terms of ideas."1
William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (eds.) The
Perth ofAnarchy, p. 4.
9) Andrew Linklater, "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International
Relations Theory Today, pp. 251-254.
10) Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and lnteres血.蝣A Sociology of lnternational Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 5.
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Hence a perspective is needed that views major changes not as a deterministic re-
sponse to large forces operative in the international system, but rather as a decision-
making process12'. This is particularly true for the so-called =Gorbachev revolution"
that brought about the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, it is necessary for us to ex-
amine factors at both the international and domestic leveトmobilising the logic of Htwo-
level games"13'to better understand such a crucial turning point in history. It is within
this context that constructivist thinkers have begun to assert the missing factors from
the mainstream theories, i. e. the role and functioning of ideational and discursive fac-
tors, and the conceptualisation of the social construction of identities, norms, and inter-
ests which this study directly addresses. Such factors have been largely bracketed or
marginalised in the realist and neoliberalist discourses.
As a consequence, it is not surprising that the end of the Cold War has generated deb-
ate on post-Cold War international relations theory. Even some realist thinkers have be-
gun to express their appreciation of this situation. Stephen Walt conceded: Hno single
approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we
are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical
orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses
and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom."14'Non-
realist theorists have also echoed this trend. Among them, James Rosenau has contended
that a new term, 'postinternationalpolitics'was needed to encompass the possible advent
of new structures and processes while at the same time allowing for still further struc-
tural development15'. His insights called on international relations theorists to make a
ll) John Lewis Gaddis, lWe Know NotU', pp. 282-83, Emphasis in original.
12) Charles Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, 1990, p. 20.
13) Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organizt
(ion,Vol.42,
14) Stephan Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, Spring 1998, p. 30. This
articulation of theoretical plurality is not common to realist thinkers. Some constructivists have also reached
the same conclusion. Yet conventional constructivists, like Katzenstein, call for further analytical perspective
to incorporate culture and identity as important causal factors that help define the interests and constitute
the actors that national security policies. Peter Katzenstein, "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing
World," in Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 537.
15) James N. Rosenau, "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Postinternational Politics for the
1990s, in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approach-
es to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 2. Emphasis in original.
James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuiか(Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1990).Of course, he is not the first theorists to propose such a scheme. About
three decades earlier, Morton Kaplan articulated such a scheme in his System and Process in International
Relations, but Kaplan's analysis belongs to the mainstream realist language.
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hypothesis on micro-macro links, which posits the processes by which the postulated
changes in individuals are translated into consequences for collectivities and structures
at the macro level. Although he did not use the term constructivism, the connotation in
his postinternational politics goes beyond his previous research programme "linkage po-
litics"16'and appears to incline toward a constructivist perspective. Along similar lines,
John Ruggie stressed the need for a conception of structure that is that is more space/
time-contingent to better study international transformation17'. For Ruggie, neorealisト
structuralist'atemporal and ahistorical treatment of international structure made it im-
possible to account for the transformation of the medieval social structure into the lib-
era! capitalist system. Ruggie contends:りThe problem is that a dimension of change is
missing from Waltz's model. It is missing because he drops the second analytical compo-
nent of political structure, differentiation of units, when discussing international system.
And he drops this component as a result of giving an infelicitous interpretation to the
sociological term `differentiation,'taking it to mean that which denotes differences rath-
er than that which denotes sepa柁teness."18) Critics of neorealism, like Ruggie, contend
that Hthe structure of the international system that neorealists treat as more or less uni-
versa! and eternal are in fact the specific consequences of particular historical condi-
tions."19'Robert Cox, who also accuses neorealism of being Hdivorced from a standpoint
in time and space," spells out two distinctive theoretical orientations201. Problem-
solving approach treats the world represented by the exisiting order with the the pre-
vailing social and power relations and institutions into which they are organised, as the
given framework for action21'. According to Cox, problem-solving theory implies
neoreahsm's objectivity which bases its purport to seek regularities in state behaviour.
By contrast, critical theory does not take institutions and social and power relations for
granted, but calls them into question by asking where they came from and whether and
how they might be in the process of changing22'. It is clear that international theories
16) James Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
17) John Gerard Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method,"
in Rosenau and Czempiel (eds.) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, p. 22.
18) John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in
Robert Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 142. Empha-
sisin original.
19) R. B. J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
31,1987,p.66.
20) Robert Cox, "Social Foces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Keohane
(ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 207.
21) Ibid., p. 208.
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which connote this critical perspective would offer a better analysis of the changing
world, a case in which how we understand the causes of the end of the Cold War
discussed below. Constructivism could share a view that any theory reveals its ideology
and hence lends support for the need to look into "reflective-ness" to be examined later.
As we see how constructivists treat the international structure, it is suffice to say here
that international structure constructivism employs encapsulates both material and
discursive nature, while neorealism's understanding of structure is primarily concerned
with materialistic power base.
As illustrated in a later secti叫constructivist approach embodies various perspec-
tives, but it shares a common concern to grapple with the explanation of change and
transformation in international relations. Chris Reus-Smit has held that the end of the
Cold War and the failure of the mainstream international relations theories to predict it
have opened the way for recent waves of constructivist scholarship, known as the =Con-
structivist Turn." According to him, "... it [the relatively peaceful dissolution of the So-
viet bloc and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself] undermined the explan-
atory hegemony of perceived failure of rationalists to predict, particularly neorealism.
Empowered by the perceived failure of rationalists to predict, let alone comprehend,
these revolutionary transformations, critical theorists went on the offence."23'Thus,
Reus-Smit has opened the way for theoretical links between constructivist perspectives
and insights from critical theorists who are not satisfied with the rationalistic explana-
tions the mainstream international relations theories employ. In a sense, constructivist
scholarship is `critical'of the mainstream theories. While these two can reinforce each
other in terms of understanding and explaining the end of Cold War, one should be
aware that they are not necessarily following the same research program. John
Mearsheimer may be correct with regard to this point, but he fails to mention that con-
structivism may constitute a wide body of those critical theories. It is important to note
that all critical theories do not share the former's research agenda. For instance,
Mearsheimer has grouped constructivism into the same category as postmodern critical
theory and neo-Marxian oriented theory24'. Admittedly, one strand of constructivism-
22) Ibid., pp. 208-10.
23) Chris Reus-Smit, The Construdivist Turn: Critical Theory After the Cold War, Working Paper No. 1996/4,
Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, p. 6, Richard Price and
Gins Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," European Journal
oflnternational Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998, p. 265.
24) John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones
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here what we could term as Hpostmodern constructivism"一may be constitutive of them.
As critical theorists as such claimed by Mearsheimer, constructivist scholarship takes
ideas seriously, and believes that discourse, or how we think and talk about the world,
largely shapes practice. Nevertheless, this statement does not lead to his assumption
that ‖international relations scholars who use critical theory to challenge and subvert
realism certainly expect to create a more harmonious and peaceful international sys-
tem."りConventional" or social constructivism aims not to subvert but to problematize
realism. Thus, simply treating the diverse strands of constructivist perspective as a mon-
ohthic critical theory as was done by Mearsheimer is a misnomer and would blind us to
the analytical and仇eoretical richness of constructivist approaches to world politics. If
the ending of the Cold War constitutes a ‖crucial test" of neorealism's capacity to ex-
plain international change26', then we need to examine how constructivism helps us to
better understand the end of the Cold War, change and transformation of world politics,
and what constructivism approaches tell us about the causes of the termination of也e
Cold War and why the mainstream international relations theories failed to tell us.
While neorealism provides an elegant but parsimonious explanation of stability and con-
tinuity, constructivist approaches aim to capture the way to analyse the issue of change
and continuity, relying on a conceptualisation that views structures and agents as linked
in a dialectical synthesis27'. Contrasting constructivism approaches with those main-
stream theories brings us to examine the ideational and discursive factors, namely the
role and functioning of ideas generated by political leadership, intellectuals and others
have had significant impact on the course of events resulting in the transformation of
the Cold War international system.
and Steven Miller (eds.) The Perils ofAnarchy, p. 364 footnote 128.
25) Ibid., p. 365. Emphasis added.
26) Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without
Politics," Review oflntel邪αtional Studies, Vol. 19, 1993, pp. 63-64.
27) Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change," in Rosenau and Czempiel
(eds.) Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, pp. 29ト292, and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms,
Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security,
p.489.
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Constructivist Accounts of the End of the Cold War and the Demise
of the Soviet Union
Changes in Domestic Politics and Leadership
Although realists failed to predict the phenomena that led to the conclusion of the
Cold War, this does not necessarily indicate that all premises of realist arguments were
doomed to fail from the beginning. With the wisdom of hindsight, some realist scholars
are turning their vigour to stress the strengths of the realist position to explain why the
Westりwon" the Cold War. Others consider the end of the Cold War as an anomaly, and
hence assert that this crucial event did not set an appropriate test for theory, but was
"merely a single data point."28'However, the differences between realists and construe-
tivists in explaining why the Cold War ended are a good point of departure, and thus
they deserve scrutiny here29'. Furthermore, the divisions between these two schools of
thought could pose us a set of metatheoretical questions-positivistic/objective versus
non-or post-positivistic/subjective epistemology, and rationalistic and empirical versus
interpretive methodology. These metatheoretical questions force us to rethink the funda-
mental theoretical bases upon which the discipline of international relations, and by ex-
tension, the social sciences at large rest30'
Conventional international theories can refer to several propositions to account for
the causes of the end of the Cold War. While realists might predicate their premises
based upon Hpeace-through-strength" logic, liberals may examine cognitive and learn-
ing effect factors. Constructivism shares certain aspects of such liberal thinking in terms
28) William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," p. 4.
29) This study acknowledges that the tracing of all fundamental causes of the end of the Cold War both from
realist and constructivist scholarship per se is a daunting task. For analytical expedience, this section attempts
to draw on the extracts of major explanations derived from both approaches.
30) Similarly, Steve Smith advances the divisions of international relations theories into constitutive versus ex-
planatory theory, as well as foundational versus anti-fundational theory. These offer an important insight
into this chapter, and will be examined later. Steve Smith,りThe Self-image of a Discipline: A Genealogy of
lnternational Relations Theory," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today,
pp. 26-31, and it　"New Approaches to Internatonal Theory," in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.) The
Globalization of lWorld Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), pp. 167- 9. I agree with Smith that international theory should be seen as one arena in which both the
clash between explanatory (based on the natural sciences'epistemology and methodology) and constitutive
(based on the social sciences outlook to approach the world from inside) and that between foundationalism
(bsed on critical interpretive theory) and anti-foundationalism (based on radical interpretivism). Variants of
constructivism to be examined are considered to be an outgrowth of these divisions.
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of the role of ideational/discursive factors. Four interrelated propositions relevant to
the realists'premises of the causes of the ending of the Cold War are set out below for
consideration: the West's preparation for war; the West's nuclear weapons and their cor-
responding capacity to deliver assured destruction; the West's functioning alliance sys-
tem, and the inherent flaw in communist ideology31'. Nonrealists, including construe-
tivists, can refute the first proposition, because it does not did not explain the domestic
change in the Soviet Union that propelled Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of top na-
tional leadership. The Gorbachev revolution in Soviet foreign policy was indeed the de-
cisive factor which brought about series of initiatives known as a "peace offensive" in
the field of arms control. The negotiation and successful conclusion of the intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF) treaty was the first case that successfully disproved the reaレ
ist proposition that negotiating from a position of strength could bring an end to the
Cold War in the West's favour. A close look at the change in domestic politics was
missing here. In this line, Thomas Risse-Kappen and others succinctly argue that
Gorbachev's Hnew thinkers" in foreign and security policy, such as Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, and Gorbachev's personal foreign policy adviser Aleksandr
Yakovlev played a key role in reformulating the Soviet foreign policy.32'They viewed
the SS-20 inter一mediate nuclear missile buildup plan as Hanother example of ilトcon-
ceived Brezhnev-era policy following a narrow military logic without taking the politi-
cal consequences into account."33'Together with Gorbachev's new thinkers, civilian ex-
perts from various institutes of the Academy of Science began to assume advisory roles
and served as a counterweight to the military expertise in the policy一making process34'
31) Charles Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy," Mershon International Studies Re-
view, Vol. 38, 1994, p. 12. John Vasquez approaches the similar topic by pointing out the inadequate realist
explanatory power. Although he does not explictly address the constructivist theme, but inclines toward
World Soceity approach, much of his argument overlaps Kegley's. John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Poll-
ties: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalゐm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 13
"Challenging the relevance and explanatory power of the realist paradigm: the debate on the end of the Cold
War."
32) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Domestic Structures, and the End of the
Cold war," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation:
National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control " Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, Matthew Evangelista, "Transnational Relations, Domestic Struc-
tures, and Security Policy in the USSR and Russia," in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) Bringing Transnational
Relations Back In : Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), Peter Shearman, "New Polititcal Thinking Reassessed," Review of International
Studies, Vol. 19, 1993, pp. 139-158, and Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Rus-
stan Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997).
33) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace Through Strength'End the Cold War? Lessons from INF," International
Secun,砂', Vol. 16, no. 1, 1991, p. 184.
34) Ibid., p. 182.
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These new thinkers were aware of the Western concepts of common security (security
can be achieved not against, but together with an adversary) and reasonable sufficiency
through interactions with their Western European counterparts.
Moreover, they must have recognised that the traditional concept of Hnational secu-
nty and modalities for achieving it may have become obsolete by the grim fact of mu-
tual vulnerability, thereby making it easier for these new thinkers to accept the Western
security concepts and to move towards security cooperation35'. Gordon Craig and Alex-
ander George claim that the emphasis on offense-oriented weapons systems, military
postures, and doctrines had had a number of highly adverse effects. Hence these new
thinkers were likely to understand ‖the efforts to ensure one's own security by adopting
offense-dominated military postures and doctrines exacerbate the o仇er side's insecuri-
ty, encourage "worst-case" fears of the adversary's intentions and of possible也reats
from the other side, feed arms race, and raise the specter of crisis instability and the
possibility of inadvertent war."36'The new Soviet leader relied on these new thinkers
whose foreign policy beliefs led them to advise a turnaround in Moscow's security POL
icy37'. This episode was but a short story in Gorbachev's ensuing revolution, but what
can be learned from it is that despite the rhetoric emphasising the West's firm determi-
nation to fight, the Soviet Union started to transform its foreign and security policy by
itself. Hence, this transformation can be better explained through reference to the
changes in leadership and domestic politics as well as the role of individuals who were
receptive to Western security ideas and who succeeded in disseminating them into the
policy一making process.
Yet not all realist scholars have dismissed these domestic and leadership change fac-
tors. William Wohlforth examined the power/idea nexus on the end of the Cold War.
He states that what was most significant about the Gorbachev's new thinking was not
its newness or the intellectual power of the ideas he sought to introduce, but the relent-
less way in which he went about trying to extricate his country from the dilemma he
thought it was in. Here the ideas employed by Gorbachev and his reformers were ana-
lysed as the best way to counter imperialism's aggressive force, presumably the West's
firm determination to continue the arms race38). Thus, according to Wohlforth, these
35) Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force andStatecraft:.　桝αtic Proble間∫ of Our Time, Second Edi-
tion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 264.
36) Ibid., p. 271.
37) Risse-Kappen, "Did `Peace Through Strength'End the Cold War?" pp.　-85.
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ideas played a balancing role. New ideas such as common security and reasonable suffi-
ciency were introduced merely to counter the old ones that exhorted the ensuing ideo-
logical rivalry and the Soviet Union's militarily superpower status39'. Accordingly, this
balancing in ideas helped the new Soviet leadership save face without feeling intimidat-
ed by accepting these new ideas (at least the transition period until these new ideas
were subsumed gave the Soviet leadership a breathing space for maintaining their su-
perpower prestige.) Wohlforth's assertion that ideas may permit or facilitate actions, but
actions give ideas substance resonates in constructivist argument. However, for con-
structivists, ideas may give meaning and substance to actions. Ideas can also be trans-
mitted or distributed to galvanise policy change. Policy change may necessitate a politi-
cal leadership that is interested, able, and willing to sponsor policy change and invest
political resources in building the necessary institutional and political support40'. A se-
quence of events leading to the end of the Cold War explained by way of this idea dis-
course has the theoretical implications for constructivism and也us we will return to it
in the following section.
Moreover, the end of the Cold War can be examined from the US side. The then US
President George Bush announced that the United States would modify its confrontation
through containment strategy-a strategy that was the backbone of the US post-World
War II strategy toward the Soviet Union. Instead the United States's new strategy
would be not to contain the Soviet Union, but to integrate it into the international com-
munity41'. This announcement was made in May 1989, well before the demise of the
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the I…ast European authoritarian regimes. If the West,
the United States in particular, had wanted to maintain its willingness to fight, then the
rationale for this strategy shift would have been inconceivable. Furthermore, it is likely
that the West could have taken advantage of the volatile situation in Eastern Europe
38) William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993), pp. 253-259.
39) Wohlforth goes on to say: "the new thinking held that balancing, rather than bandwagoning, governed the
alignment of states on the world scence. And it maintained that military power was no longer so important
either for achieving security or for pursuing political goals. What the new approach did not address directly
was the question of prestige. New Soviet universalism obscured the old question of decline." Ibid., p. 259.
Here the new thinking is taken to mean the balancing of the long-held Soviet superpower status belief with
the changing perception ofりmilitarily debunked or normal power."
Janice Gross Stein, "Ideas, Even Good Ideas, Are not Enough: Changing Canada's Foreign and Defence Poli-
cies," InternationalJournal, Vol. 50, 1994-5, p..
41) President George Bush's Address at 7おAgricultural and Mechanical University, May 12, 1989, quoted in
Takehiko Kamo, Kokusai Anzenhoshou no Ko船oil [ Vision for International Security] (Tokyo: Iwanami Sh。ten,
1990), p. 226, footnote 7.
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which was unfavourable for the Soviet Union.
On theRole of Nuclear Weapons
The s∝ond premise concerning the utility of nuclear weapons invites controversy
among international relations scholars. Realists posit也at the existence of nuclear
forces contribute to a "nuclear peace"; liberals may argue that not the existence of nu-
clear weapons but "nuclear learning" and some security regimes hold the key to the sta-
bihty between the two opposing camps in the post-Second World War world; construe-
tivists might hold that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the absence of war between
the superpowers, and that the transformation of how each perceived the other-in the
realm of changing state identity一mattered. Here the constructivist theme仇at takes both
materialistic and ideational factors seriously may make us reconsider the purely maten-
alistic view of thb role and presence of nuclear weapons which has dominated the lan-
guage of strategy thinkers.
Nonrealist thinkers who question this second proposition may claim that it is very dif-
ficult to set up counterfactual premises on the utility of nuclear weapons. These being:
how would the world have been if there had been no nuclear weapons since the end of
Second World War? In the absence of nuclear weapons, would血ere have been large-
scale conventional war, in Europe or between the two superpowers? Would some regions
m which也e American extended deterrence was provided would have been involved in
any sort of conflicts? We may never find adequate answers to these questions. It is diffi-
cult to isolate any independent effects produced by nuclear weapons since they were co-
incidental with other factors that may have contributed to the Soviet Union's respect for
the territorial status quo42'. It is true that nuclear weapons gave the superpowers the
ability to destroy each other's heartlands in a way that other rivals could not-but nucle-
ar weapons did not provide either a motive to destroy those heartlands or a means to
occupy them43'. Even so, there is no telling how many nuclear warheads were considered
sufficient to deter aggressive action, or what types of weapons were necessary for deter-
rence. At best, we can only raise questions pertaining to the logic of deterrence and its
inherent uncertainties. Nuclear deterrence involves a ra也er simple causation: if a state
42) Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die?", p. 16.
43) Bruce Russett, "Controlling the Soviet-US Enduring Rivalry: What was the Role of Nuclear Weapons?" in
Jorn Gjelstad and Olav Niolstad (eds.) Nuclear Rivalry and International Order (Oslo: International Peace Re-
search Institute, 1996), p. 81.
246 国際公共政策研究 第5巻第1号
A wants to prevent an attack against it, it must possess nuclear forces and demonstrate
its willingness to use them in case of an emergency; an adversary stateB, if it wishes to
attack A with its nuclear weapons, must defend its own people and wealth against a
possible second-attack from A. Conventional rationality dictates that prudent statesmen
m both A and B will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Here the attacking side
shows its resolve to use nuclear weapons, but at the same time it cannot actually use
them, given the expected unbearable damages inflicted by a second strike from an oppo-
nent in retaliation for the first strike. Neither of the superpowers can escape from this
unusability paradox. Lawrence Freedman argues, analysing the history of nuclear stra-
tegies, that in practice neither superpowers emerge with a decisive advantage: each
remains capable of confounding the most ruthless and devious plans of the other, by
ensuring an unavoidable risk of unendurable destruction44'. Likewise, Lebow and Stein
observe the inherent uncertainties about nuclear deterrence, and point out that strategic
buildups are more likely to provoke than to restrain adversaries because of their impact
on the domestic balance of political power in the target state, thereby easily triggering
reaction45'. Freedman concludes: HNevertheless the experience of the past decades sug一
gests that while the basic structure of the contemporary international system was
shaped by the arrival of nuclear weapons it is now only marginally affected by varia-
tions in nuclear policies."46'Some reali鴫however, acknowledge the point that nuclear
weapons have not changed the structure of the international system. Yet they try to
modify the neorealist's rigid structural analysis which takes anarchy as a starting point,
by adding a new function of nuclear weapons. Steve Weberb "joint custodianship" al-
lows the superpowers special responsibilities that no other states are in a position to
perform47'. Accordingly, this new function makes a contrast to the Waltzian account of
the non-differentiation of function among units in the international system. Joint custo-
dianship reflects both the superpowers'predominance of nuclear weapons in terms of
both quantitative and qualitative advantage over other powers, and the ability to posi-
tively manage the system in a bipolar world because externalities and problem of col-
44) Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Second Edition (London: Macmillan in association
with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 428.
45) Richard Ned Lebow and Janis Gross Stein, "Nuclear Lessons of the Cold War," in Ken Booth (ed.) Statecraft
and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 81.
46) Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 431.
47) Steve Weber, "Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons," International Organization, Vol. 44, No.l, 1990, p. 64.
"Joint custodianship" means that the superpowers take on management tasks that would not be performed in
a bipolar system without nuclear deterrence. Ibid., p. 77.
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lective action are reduced as也e number of great powers decline48'. The events from the
early-1980s through the 1990s, however, appeared to belie this proposition. It was not a
bipolar world that both Waltz and Weber envisaged, and the number of actors enjoying
great power status were not reduced. For example, West Germany opposed to the inten-
tions of the United States when Washington was eager to introduce new Pershing II
missiles and cruise missiles to Western Europe. Moreover, new societal actors gained
momentum m shaping the course of states'security policy-the mass peace movement in
Western Europe in particular affected the course of the superpower arms control nego-
tiations that ensued. These facts are related to the counterargument to the third propo-
sition and thus will be examined later.
While the underlying assumptions of nuclear deterrence and the consequences of the
nuclear arms race between the superpowers, as was described earlier in the case of INF,
may be subject to the interpretation of central policy-planners in the governments of
both superpowers, the second proposition on nuclear weapons involves another aspect
on which realists asserting the peace-through-strength thesis have not focused ade-
quately49'. The nuclear arms race did not merely create severe competition and confron-
tation between its participants, but it also produced a series of security cooperation re-
gimes. Through them, the two superpowers have learned some fundamental "rules of
prudence" for managing their rivalry and for dealing with occasional confrontations
without becoming embroiled in warfare50'. These security regimes were formed both
bilaterally and multilateraly. According to this view, since the early 1970s when both
the United States and the Soviet Union sought to limit their strategic arms and to install
anti-ballistic missile defence systems (the arms control treaty materialised in the SALT
and ABM agreements) to the INF negotiations through the strategic arms reduction
talks in the early 1990s, both sides appeared to have learned crucial norms, rules and
principles to regulate their conduct. Craig and George point out: first, recognition of
parity as a criterion for regulating the level of and the relationship between U. S. and
Soviet strategic forces; second, recognition and acceptance of mutual vulnerability in a
nuclear war; and finally, acceptance of the link between offence and defence51'. As for
48) Ibid., p. 65.
49) Steve Weber's joint custodianship premise touches on the positive management side of security cooperation in
both highly institutionalized bodies and less formal ones. Weber, "Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons,"
pp. 66-77.
50) Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 263.
51) Ibid., p. 267.
248 国際公共政策研究 第5巻第1号
multilateral regimes, the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime (NPT) is illustrative
of this kind of learning. Even after the Second Cold War broke out following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, neither the United States or the Soviet Union marginalised the
NPT regime, instead working to strengthen it. Summing up this nuclear learning issue,
Joseph Nye portrays the four areas where such learning has reached a point of common
knowledge: the destructive power of the weapons; the nuclear control problem resulting
m some crisis management practices; the proliferation problem, and arms race stability
involving the same three norms Craig and George maintained52'. Viewing this learning
effect from a different angle, it is also noteworthy that the Chernobyl nuclear plant dis-
aster m 1985 also had an impact on the Soviet leadership and served as a lesson for
political consequences should nuclear exchange take place.
Constructivists'counter-argument on this second proposition can be linked to the first
one. They may posit that the role of nuclear weapons would not have changed, deterring
the parties concerned from attacking each other; however, the meaning of nuclear weap-
ons may have changed, affecting the West's determination to fight. More than three dec-
ades ago, George Kennan observed, ‖the image of a Stalinist Russia poised and yearning
to attack the West, and deterred only by [U. S.] possession of atomic weapons, was
largely a creation of the Western imagination."53'In a similar fashion, Ken Booth's
"Cold War mindsets" illuminates the point. The Cold War mindsets Hinformed much
superpower behaviour during the Cold War, and helped perpetuate and intensify the
confrontation, and frequently proved counter-productive."54'Hence, throughout the
Cold War era, the American construction of the Soviet Union as a threat contributed to
the cold war policies of the United States55', and maybe vice versa. The underlying as-
sumption was that the Cold War was socially constructed-if one saw the other as an
adversary in the political, economic, military, social, and ideological fields, then the
same perception would be mirrored through the adversary's lens. Booth sums up the
case in point as follows:
52) Joseph S. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U. S.-Soviet Security Regimes," Interantional Organization, Vol. 41,
No. 3, 1987, pp. 382-391.
53) George Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown), p. 361, quoted in Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die?", p.
16.
54) Ken Booth, "Cold Wars of the mind," in Ken Booth (ed.) Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33.
55) Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union as Other," Alternatives, Vol. 13. pp. 415-42 and
Creating the Second ColdlVaγ: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 1990), quoted in Albert Yee, "The
Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1996, p. 101.
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'What enmity promises is the clarification of one's own identity. Enemies in a Cold War are
undoubtedly real-they pose a material threat and have hostile intent-but enemy images can
also be an effective source in domestic and foreign policy- Psychologically, enemy imaging
serves several possible functions: it may help sublimate frustration, justify improper behav-
lour, serve to focus aggressiveness, divert attention from other problems, and provide a con-
trast by which to measure or inflate one's own worth or value. Sociologically, enemy images
may foster solidarity and cohesion, improve the definition of objectives and make it easier for
individuals to accept training and socialisation in group norms. Politically, enemy images can
assist in the identification of interests, the definition of goals, the planning of programmes, the
socialisation of citizens, the maintenance of an ideology, and, by polarising good and evil, can
intensify orthodoxy and dogmatism and so help create heightened nationalism and consensus.
In short, enemies can be useful."5
Thus both superpowers may have fought what Kaldor termed an imaginary war
against each other. The nuclear weapons possessed by one side were hence given the
meaning of evilness by the other. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union represented different worlds; in Washington's eyes, Moscow was an expansionist
and exporter of international communism, while in the Kremlin, Washington was an ex-
porter of capitalist imperialism. Jutta Weldes argues that in the process of articulation,
particular phenomena, whether objects, events or social relations, are represented in
sp∝me ways and given particular meanings on which action is based57'. Thus Cold War
could be taken to be no less than an aggregate of the different meanings attached to
each superpower. The logic of constructivists runs: "People act toward objects, includ-
ing other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for也em. States act
differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening
and friends are not."58'Hence the meaning of Britain's nuclear forces is totally different
to the United States from that of the Soviet Union. Nuclear arms races between the
superpowers may have reinforced this vicious meaning and served to solidify such nega-
tive symbol construction. During the detente period in the 1970s, SALT I and ABM
56) Booth, "Cold Wars of the mind," p. 35.
57) Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3,
1996, pp. 284-85.
58) Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," Internet-
tional Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 396-97. Similarly, Raymond Garthoff, who once headed the US
delegation to SALT negotiations in the 1970s, argued that the Cold War ended when the ideological under-
pinmngs of a world view based on an adversarial relationship were abandoned in word and deed by the pro-
tagomst and the antagonist. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Who is to Blame for the Cold War?" in Booth (ed.) Slate-
craft and Security, p. 65.
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agreements laid the foundation for the spirit of arms control negotiations thereafter, but
the meaning of nuclear weapons possessed by both states remained intact. Modus
operandi of the arms control in this period was to limit the number of delivery systems,
but not to reduce them. It was not until the INF negotiations that an entire category of
weapons systems-warheads and delivery systems-was eliminated from both sides, to-
gether with the unprecedented intrusive verification (on-site inspection) systems. Since
INF negotiations, both West and East military blocs began to conduct conventional
forces reduction talks (CFE) in Europe. Moreover both the United States and the Soviet
Union signed the START I treaty to reduce the total nuclear warheads down to some
six thousand. These events took place after Gorbachev took power. Beginning with the
INF arms controls, it is likely that the meaning of nuclear weapons has been trans-
formed over time. They were no longer an intractable subject of reduction. Especially
for the United States, Soviet counterparts proved trustworthy to negotiate with; Soviet
new thinkers who became Gorbachev's aides, as was discussed already, were receptive
to Western security thinking, and they may have looked like us to the American negotia-
tors. As Alexander Wendt asserts, "if the United States and Soviet Union decide that
they are no longer enemies, 〃the cold war is over." Thus constructivists takes seriously
this collective meaning that constitute the structures which organize our action59'.
Solid Western Alliance causing the Soviet bloc to demise?
On debate over the third proposition that the West's solid alliance system contributed
to the end of the Cold War, non-realists present a different Cold War history. Probably
most relevant to the third proposition is the case of the early 1980s, when deliberation
was taking place on introducing Pershing II missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles to
Western Europe as a countermeasure to Moscow's deployment of intermediate-range
SS-20s to Eastern European states. Craig and George described the impact of this deb-
ate as follows: HAmerican pressure for new nuclear weapons contributed to the growth
of a massive anti-nuclear movement in Europe, a coalition of lefトwing socialists, mili-
tant Christians, pacifists, environmental protectionists, members of alternative and
extraparhamentary groups, and indiscriminate activists, which was not successful in
preventing the deployment of the new missiles but certainly strengthened anti-Ameri-
canism in Western Europe and probably contributed in the long run to the emergence of
59) Ibid., p. 397.
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a growing feeling that it would be advisable not to terminate the American alliance, but
to diminish reliance upon it."60'For these Europeans, the peace movement issue chal-
lenged the NATO orthodoxy, i.e. coupling the Western Europe's security with extended
deterrence. Also the new missiles issue was taken to mean that "the United States was
setting up Europe to suffer the consequences of its global anti-communist crusade, and
the cruise and Pershing missiles were the chosen instrument of this policy."61'The tim-
ing of this mass demonstration was important because the "Second" had already set in.
Despite也e new phase of the Cold War, Western societies at large were not as solidly
united as the realist proposition asserts. Some European states, especially West and East
Germany, demonstrated their willingness to pursue detente, irrespective of even the
tense years, by aiming to change也e rules of the Cold War game. This was accompa-
nied by the rise of the sensitive state, civic, and societal actors in the international
arena62'. Thus the cohesion of the Western alliance was not as monolithic as the realists
argued. This event indicated that social movements from below within the Western alii-
ance defied the legitimacy of the conventional security politics. To borrow from Ann
Tickner, "by rearticulating security in terms of those who are most vulnerable, security
becomes a process of which begins at the bottom."63'Moreover, it would be difficult to
judge a related proposition that the existence of NATO contributed to prevent war be-
tween it and the Warsaw Pact Organisation. As Kegley pointed out, there was no wars
fought by the major powers between 1945 and 1949 when the international situation was
more tense and volatile, and before NATO came into existence64'. Thus whether NATO
helped prevent a war during the Cold War period would not be a comparable argument
here. Instead other factors should be sought for better understanding.
Liberal thinkers in particular seem to have become more salient to argue against this
third proposition than constructivists. In a sense, it might be contended that construe-
tivists could capitalise on this liberal upsurge to expand their analytical scope. Indeed,
some constructivists, such as Risse-Kappen, attempt to explore the alliance solidarity of
60) Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 151.
61) Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 401.
62) Kamo, Kokusai Anzenhosho no Kousou, pp. 246-48. During 1983, when the United States and the Soviet Union
failed to reach the arms control agreement in Geneva, and both began to deploy their intermediate-range
missiles, West and East Germany's political leaders exchanged mutal contact to reaffirm their intention not
to terminate the detente between the Germanies. Likewise, Bulgarian and Romanian leaders also voiced their
concern over the deployment of the new missiles.
63) J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in Booth and Smith (eds.) International Relations Tke0秒Today, p.
190.
64) Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die?" p. 18.
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NATO by linking liberal internationalism to the constructivist theme which draws on
collective identity formation among members as well as prescription of norms informing
appropriate behaviour for them65'. In addition, Deudney and Ikenberry explained the
demise of the Cold War not merely by the Western alliance's solidarity alone but also
included other factors such as the complex sociological and economic systems led by the
United States. They held that capitalism, American culture and society, and the West-
ern-dominated international organisations, as well as the Western alliance thwarted the
Soviet intention to expand, while at the same time presenting an appealing alterna-
tive66'. According to them, the West maintained sufficient military strength to contain
the Soviet Union defensively, while the pluralistic, pacific and open features of these
Western systems, not only in the military alliance, made it difficult for the West to pur-
sue a policy to actively and directly assail the Soviet offensively; paradoxically, as the
West became more economically and militarily powerful, it presented an increasingly
benign face to the Soviet Union, regardless of the rhetoric emphasised by Western
leaders67'. The Soviet Communist Party's journal Kommunist explained in early 1988
that "there are no politically influential forces in either Western Europe or the US" that
contemplate Hmilitary aggression against socialism," and Hbourgeois democracy serves
as a definite barrier in the path of unleashing such a war."68'Therefore, Deudney and
Ikenberry conclude that the real victor of the Cold War was the Western system itself,
whose vitality and accommodating attractiveness encouraged the adversary to emulate.
Recent entry of the so-called Visegrad states-Hungary, Czech, and Poland-into NATO
is likely to underscore this assumption.
The end of the Cold War also reinvigorated liberal thought which draws on the Kanti-
an theme. Although Kant broadly covered many philosophical questions that go beyond
the purview of this study, the Kantian theme here refers to universalist tradition. It con-
notes the transnational social bonds that link the individual human beings who are sub-
jects or citizens of states, and treats international relations as taking place only appar-
ently among states, but also envisages the possibility that the quintessential feature of
international relations is really the relationship between all individuals in the commu-
65) Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein
(ed.) The Culture of National Security, pp. 357-99.
66) Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security,
Vol. 16, No. 3, 1991/92, p. 114.
67) Ibid., pp. 114-15.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 263.
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nity of mankind69'. Michael Doyle, imbued with Kantian liberal internationalism, points
out that peace could be brought about both from above and below. Commerce, economic
development and other transnational ties tend to put pressure on authoritarian regimes
from below. He demonstrated that tourism, educational exchanges, and scientific meet-
mgs with the liberal world may have had a liberalizing effect on the many Soviets and
Eastern European elites who visited the West during the Cold War70'. And of course, the
new Soviet leadership exerted influence from above, as we have discussed.
Among other liberal thinkers inspired by the wake of the end of the Cold War,
Francis Fukuyama deserves mentioning. His assertion "The End of History" deals with
market capitalism and political democracy as the two main pillars of the Western lib-
eralism, against which no rival alternatives exist in the post-Cold War world. Accord-
ing to him, liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological
evolution" and the "final form of human government," and as such constituted the "end
of history."71'Fukuyama employs what he termed "thymos" or human intrinsic desire to
be recognised, to look into the events up to the demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. A triad comprising a human personality-desire, reason, and recognition-is criti-
cal to political life, which, according to Hegel, drives the whole historical process7
People in the Eastern bloc wanted to live a comparable life to the Westerners, and
glimpses of show-cases in West German shops served to encourage their inherent de-
sires. Such Western institutions as liberal democracy and market economy have under-
scored this desire for recognition. For Fukuyama's liberal account, political liberal de-
mocracy and the market economy could provide an alternate vision for Eastern Euro-
peans to emulate. He describes it this way:
"Certainly, many Eastern Europeans wanted an end to communism for less than elevated
economic reasons, that is, because they thought that this would pave the way toward West
German living standards. The fundamental impulse for the reforms undertaken in the Soviet
Union and China was in a certain sense economic… the inability of centralized command
economies to meet the requirements of the "post-industrial" society."73'
69) Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977),
p.25.
70) Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War," in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Richard Ned
Lebow (eds.) International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press,
1995),p.97.
71) Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p. xi.
72) Ibid., pp. xvi-vii.
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Internal Flaws in Soviet Ideology
Constructivists may relate these liberal accounts to examine the fourth proposition on
the inherent flaw in communism. Kratochwil claims that the change caused by
Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost are better explained by reference to what he calls
"the legitimization crisis of communism." Legitimation crisis is an identity crisis that
occurs when "the political system fails to gain an input of mass loyalty that is as diffuse
as possible; it results from the fact that fulfilment of governmental planning tasks places
in question the structure of the depoliticised public realm and, thereby, the formally
democratic securing of the private autonomous disposition of the means of produc-
tion."74'Applied here, this legitimization crisis took place in Eastern Europe where the
directives and command economy imposed by Moscow achieved little success in the
form of multilateral institutional framework, while the Western institutional framework
had developed considerable dynamism by the end of the 1980s75'. The communist legiti-
macy endowed by Moscow upon its satellite states failed to show the mass loyalty and
self-confidence necessary to restore their empire by force, as events in Hungary in 1956,
m Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980-81 suggested. As a result, communist
power was discredited and the Warsaw Pact's cohesion melted much more quickly than
it would have been in the heart of a real war76'. For Moscow's leadership, this legitima-
tion crisis became apparent in a secret Gorbachev note in 1986. In it Gorbachev aban-
doned Brezhnev's doctrine of limiting the sovereignty of East European states, where
leading communist parties'relations with Moscow had been under Moscow's thumb
throughout years of warning, censure, enforcement and directive practices, and the Po-
htburo endorsed this doctrinal change77'. Thus it was not difficult to understand why
Eastern Europeans staged the mass movements brought about sweeping changes
through a new conception of empowerment78'. This empowerment led to the exonera-
tion of former political prisoners, such as Vaclav Havel, and brought people's power to
centre stage throughout Eastern Europe. These movements brought about a somewhat
73) Ibid., p. 177. It is noted that Fukuyama's account underlies Hegelian idealism.
74) Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 46.
75) Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes," p. 73.
76) Fukuyama, The End ofHist0秒and the LastMan, p. 258.
77) Alexander S. Tsipko, Breaking with Communism, translated by Tsuneko Mochizuki, [Komyunizumu tono
Ketsubetsuj (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1993), pp. 39-40.
78) Vaclav Havel et al. (eds) The Poiuer of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (Lon-
don: 1985), quoted in Fukuyama, ibid., p. 63.
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tranquil transition called the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia, but led to blood-
shed in the overthrow of the regime in Romania. The events sparked by a series of
legitimation crisis suggested that change in ideology initiates the systemic change, con-
trary to the neorealist maxim which posits that the distribution of capabilities deter-
mines a state's position in the international system. When the cataclysmic changes be-
gan to sweep over Eastern I〈urope, there was no hegemonic war; indeed no tanks were
deployed to subdue these movements. The Soviet Union remained a superpower in ma-
tenal terms when these events were unleashed under Gorbachev. Therefore, we can
argue that political will and power bringing about ideological change in communism
accounts better for the relatively peaceful transformation in Eastern Europe.
In Lieu of Conclusion
Constructivists consider the political arena, whether domestic or international, as
linked by the actors and structure of a given system. Actors can reproduce and change
the system through their actions, which might lead to the alterations of the rules of the
game, namely the Cold War conduct of behaviour and mindset discussed in this paper.
As Koslowski and Kratochwil claim, ‖Fundamental change of the international system
occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of
international interaction. Moreover, reproduction of the practice of international actors
(i. e., states) depends on the reproduction of practices of domestic actors (i. e., individu-
als and groups). Therefore, fundamental changes in international politics occur when
beliefs and identities of domestic actors are altered thereby also altering the rules and
norms that are constitutive of their political practices."79)
Taking into consideration these constructivist contentions, this literature review has
sought alternative propositions regarding the causes of the end of the Cold War by ex-
amining the domestic politics factors caused by leadership shi晦cognitive learning
factors which are likely to provide an alternative account for the nuclear peace thesis,
liberal society's attractiveness, as well as the change in identity and ideology.
However, these analyses could bring together both liberals and constructivists. They
illuminate the infusion of new ideas, especially new security concepts and the role of the
79) Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Understanding Changes in International Politics: the Soviet
Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, p. 216.
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influential individuals who served as catalysts, and helped to trace the change in belief
and identity. To put it differently, the above analyses aim to grasp the cataclysmic
events from Hinside-out" by allowing observers a perspective similar to that of the con-
cerned agents, while structural account cherished by neorealism in particular aims to
approach fromりoutside-in," utilising hypothetical-deductive skill80). Thus far, we could
argue whetherthe discourse on idea would be relevant to the above debate. However,
we do not yet know how the ideational discourse operates. Further analysis must be
needed to answer this question. It appears in this area that constructivist scholarship
could articulate its research orientation by drawing on insights drawn from sociological
and philosophical fields. Further inquiry into these realms from the international rela-
tions scholarship has been made in the name of the ・third debate'It is beyond the pur-
view of this review to enter into this debate, but another constructivist turn could be
advanced if constructivist scholarship incorporated the third debate.
Vasquez also refers to much of these nonrealist explanatory variables such as the role of domestic politics,
the impact of two-level games in light of the relative influence of hard-liners and acc0mmodationists, the
importance of cognitive structures and learning, the impact of rules of the games on making peace possible
the influence of transnational actors and coalitions, and the relative importance of interactions over systemic
structure. However, he cautions against liberal account for its ideological tendencies that will swallow up any
scientifically neutral attempt to test its empirical components. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, pp. 324-
47, and 356. Constructivism considered to be one of this nonrealist thinking also embodies this ideological/
ideational component as well as materialistic one, and thus does not always necessitate such scientific neutral
stance as Vasquez claims. Indeed, constructivism's ontological "middle ground" rather seems to obfuscate
Vasquez's scientific testing criterion. The term "middle ground" comes from Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the
Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of lnternational Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3
1997.
